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The Missing Constitutionalism of Canada v Vavilov 
 
KATE GLOVER BERGER 
 
This article argues that the Supreme Court of Canada’s recent opinion in Canada (Minister 
of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov—the biggest administrative law case in a 
decade—pays insufficient attention to the constitutional dimensions of the case. Vavilov 
represents, therefore, a missed opportunity to engage deeply with issues of structural and 
administrative constitutionalism, issues that arise in countless public law cases, including 
in Toronto (City) v Ontario (Attorney General). This article argues that when Vavilov’s 
constitutional dimensions are brought to the surface, they reveal neglected possibilities in 
the Toronto (City) appeal and map some of the legal terrain on which the case could be 
received and should be analyzed. This article presents this argument in three parts. First, 
it provides an overview of Vavilov, pointing to some of its key legal developments and 
implications for administrative law. This part considers whether the majority reasons in 
Vavilov promote a thin approach to constitutionalist reasoning in administrative cases. 
Second, it considers two additional matters of constitutional structure that are at stake (but 
insufficiently addressed) in Vavilov: (a) the consequences of an inconsistency between 
legislation and unwritten constitutional principles; and (b) the significance of institutional 
design to understanding the role, relationships, and reform of public actors. Each of these 
matters is also at stake in Toronto (City) and this part shows why it is important to look to 
Vavilov when resolving them. This article concludes with a discussion of a third matter of 
constitutional structure and administrative constitutionalism that is implicated (but 
neglected) in Vavilov, and is of relevance to Toronto (City): the place and status of the 
administrative state within the Canadian constitutional order. Vavilov was a perfect 
opportunity to engage with decades of administrative law developments in order to address 
some of that neglect, but unfortunately, the opportunity was missed. 
 
 
THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA’S 2019 opinion in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration) v Vavilov was one of the most significant administrative law cases in a decade.1 In 
it, the Court set out a new approach to choosing the standard of review in applications for judicial 
review and a revised approach for assessing the reasonableness of administrative decisions. These 
issues are quintessential matters of Canadian administrative law, taken up in Vavilov not because 
of anything particularly demanding on the facts of the case but because, it seems, that the Supreme 
Court deemed it time to respond to extensive criticism of the existing approach to judicial review 
from administrative law scholars, counsel, and the bench.   
While clearly an administrative law case, Vavilov is, this article argues, a case of 
fundamentally constitutional character. The task the Supreme Court set for itself in Vavilov—that 
is, to establish a principled, pragmatic, and just approach to judicial review that accounts for the 
 
 Kate Glover Berger is an Assistant Professor at Osgoode Hall Law School. She is grateful to Simon Archer, 
Alexandra Flynn, and Mariana Valverde for organizing the Workshop on Canadian Municipalities and the 
Constitution and for serving as guest editors of this Special Issue. She is also grateful to the editors and staff of the 
Journal of Law and Social Policy for their valuable work on this piece and to the anonymous peer reviewers for their 
insightful comments.  
1 2019 SCC 65 [Vavilov].  
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realities of the public institutions involved and of the parties affected by administrative action2—
called on the Court to adopt not only an administrative law perspective but a constitutional 
perspective as well. The exercise of judicial review is always constitutional in the small “c” sense. 
It is an exercise in determining the proper relationship between organs of government3—the courts, 
the legislature, and the administrative state (standard of review)—in a particular instance and an 
exercise of authority that lies at the inherent core of the superior courts’ constitutional jurisdiction, 
namely to uphold the rule of law through assessing the legality of state action.4  
But determining the framework for how the courts should exercise their powers of judicial 
review, rather than simply carrying out such powers within that framework, calls for a more 
searching constitutional analysis. To properly realize the constitutional balance of power between 
the legislature, the courts, the executive, and the administrative state, the Court must have a deep 
understanding of the realities and status of each of the institutions involved, as well as a 
comprehensive vision of how those institutions should relate to each other, that is, of “the grander 
constitutional order, and the nature and position of the administrative state within that order.”5 In 
“The Constitution of the Administrative State,” I observed that at the heart of critical calls for 
reform of, and stability within, the jurisprudential approach to judicial review, that is at the heart 
of the criticisms that ultimately led to Vavilov, is a longing for “a jurisprudence of administrative 
law that is sustained by a grand vision of the Canadian public order” and “for administrative law 
reasoning that connects individual cases to a thick conception of the administrative state.”6 I 
concluded that in order to satisfy these longings, the Supreme Court need not be unanimous in its 
approach to judicial review despite calls for stability and unity (and indeed, Vavilov was not 
unanimous), but rather that the Court’s “analysis of administrative law questions [including how 
to conduct judicial review] must be built from architectural materials, from inferences drawn out 
of ‘the structure of government that [the Constitution] seeks to implement,’ from an accounting of 
the assumptions that underlie the public order [and their implications], and from the links and 
relationships between public actors and elements of the Canadian state.”7 In other words, I pointed 
to a desire for a judicial review jurisprudence that is based on a careful and updated account of the 
nature of the administrative state, its position within the public order as a whole, and the resulting 
character of its interactions with other institutions of governance and the public.  
This article continues this argument but with a more specific focus. It argues that when the 
Court took on the task of rethinking its approach to judicial review in Vavilov, it should have drawn 
more heavily on insights from architectural features of the constitution8 (structural 
constitutionalism) and from the relationship between administrative decision-making and 
constitutional interpretation (administrative constitutionalism). Doing so would have promoted 
coherence and comprehensiveness in the majority’s revised approach to judicial review in Vavilov 
and future cases of judicial review, and would have also promoted the development of a consistent 
 
2 Ibid at paras 4-15.  
3 Ontario (Attorney General) v OPSEU, [1987] 2 SCR 2 at para 86 [OPSEU]. 
4 Crevier v AG (Québec) et al, [1981] 2 SCR 220 at 236-8. 
5 Kate Glover Berger, “The Constitution of the Administrative State” in Marcus Moore & Daniel Jutras, eds, Canada’s 
Chief Justice: Beverley McLachlin’s Legacy of Law and Leadership (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2018) 167 at 184 [Berger, 
“The Constitution”]. 
6 Ibid at 169.   
7 Ibid.  
8 In this article, I use “constitution” to refer to “the global system of rules and principles which govern the exercise of 
constitutional authority in the whole and in every part of the Canadian state”: Reference re Resolution to Amend the 
Constitution, [1981] 1 SCR 753 at 874 and “Constitution” to refer to the formal, entrenched features of the constitution.  
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vision of the grand constitutional order across constitutional and administrative law, showing how 
cases of administrative law can be precedents for constitutional cases and vice versa. As this article 
will show, this opportunity to participate in promoting this form of unity within public law was 
not fully realized in Vavilov. 
Before moving on to the specific claims of this article, the terms “structural 
constitutionalism” and “administrative constitutionalism” warrant elaboration. Both concepts are 
interested in the relationship between constitutional and administrative law and the interaction 
between the constitution and the administrative state. First, I use “structural constitutionalism” to 
refer to an interest in, or the study of, the architectural—or structural—features of the Constitution, 
the interaction between these features, the ways in which these features change, and their 
interpretive implications. The structural features of the Constitution reflect the “structure of 
government that [the constitution] seeks to implement”9 and include the institutional design of 
individual public actors, the institutional arrangements found within the constitutional order as a 
whole, the foundational assumptions underlying the constitutional text, the implications of those 
assumptions, and the relationships and interactions between constitutional elements.10  
A structural perspective is associated with a form of interpretation, namely structural 
reasoning. As the Supreme Court explains, the “notion of architecture expresses the principle that 
‘[t]he individual elements of the Constitution are linked to the others, and must be interpreted by 
reference to the structure of the Constitution as a whole.’”11 “In other words,” the Court writes, 
“the Constitution must be interpreted with a view to discerning the structure of government that it 
seeks to implement. The assumptions that underlie the text and the manner in which the 
constitutional provisions are intended to interact with one another must inform our interpretation, 
understanding, and application of the text.”12 Put yet another way, structural reasoning draws 
“inferences from the existence of constitutional structures and the relationships which the 
Constitution ordains among these structures.”13 This article examines what Vavilov says about the 
structural features of the constitution, in particular what it says about the administrative state and 
its position relative to other state institutions by establishing a new approach to judicial review. In 
addition, this article presents three issues of structural constitutionalism, each raised in Vavilov 
and none adequately addressed, and each of relevance to the administrative law context and 
beyond: the impact of unwritten principles on the constitutionality of legislation, the relevance of 
institutional design to public law decision-making, and the constitutional status of the 
administrative state. 
The last two issues of structural constitutionalism, along with the Vavilov majority’s new 
approach to judicial review, are also of interest to administrative constitutionalism. Administrative 
constitutionalism is often used to refer to the interpretation and implementation of constitutional 
rights by administrative actors.14 Indeed, this is one of the core areas of interest for administrative 
 
9 Reference re Reform of the Senate, 2014 SCC 32 at para 26 [Senate Reform Reference]. 
10 See e.g. ibid; Reference re Supreme Court Act, ss 5 and 6, 2014 SCC 21 at paras 76-103 [Supreme Court Act 
Reference]; Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217 at paras 32-105 [Secession Reference].  
11 Senate Reform Reference, supra note 9 at para 26, quoting from Secession Reference, ibid at para 50. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution (New York: Oxford, 1982) at 74; Robin Elliot, 
“References, Structural Argumentation and the Organizing Principles of Canada’s Constitution” (2001) 80 Can Bar 
Rev 67 at 74. 
14 See e.g. Sophia Z Lee, “Race, Sex, and Rulemaking: Administrative Constitutionalism and the Workplace, 1960 to 
the Present” (2010) 96 Va L Rev 799; Leonid Sirota, “The Unholy Trinity: The Failure of Administrative 
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constitutionalists. But as Gillian Metzger explains, the scope of administrative constitutionalism 
can be fruitfully understood to capture a more expansive set of interactions between administrative 
action and constitutional interpretation in order to more fully work through the relationship 
between administrative decision-making and the constitutional.15 The more expansive 
understanding of administrative constitutionalism emphasizes the “constitutional dimensions of 
seemingly ordinary implementation and policymaking, combined with its frequent creative 
character”16 and is thus, interested in matters such as the “application of established constitutional 
requirements by administrative agencies,”17 “the elaboration of new constitutional understandings 
by administrative actors,” 18 and the “construction (or ‘constitution’) of the administrative state 
through structural and substantive measures.”19  
With these understandings, it may be obvious that setting the parameters for the exercise 
of judicial review is a matter of interest to both structural constitutionalism and administrative 
constitutionalism as it amounts to identifying the roles of and relationships between branches and 
actors of government in supervision of the administrative state.20 But the claim of this article is 
that the Court’s redesign of judicial review in Vavilov raises additional issues that are helpfully, 
and importantly, exposed and elaborated by these two constitutionalist perspectives. More 
specifically, this article explores how greater attention to the constitutional dimensions of judicial 
review is necessary to working through the issues taken up in Vavilov. Taking on perspectives of 
structural and administrative constitutionalism helps to expose these constitutional dimensions and 
their relevance. Further, this article shows that the constitutional issues that could have been 
developed in Vavilov but were not are relevant not only in the context of administrative review but 
also outside the context of judicial review. In other words, when we approach the issues in Vavilov 
through the lenses of structural and administrative constitutionalism, we can see how 
administrative and constitutional law—and the administrative state and the constitution—are, and 
indeed must be, in conversation with each other. More accurately, we come to wonder where the 
edges of constitutionalism end in the administrative sphere.   
To make this last point about the common terrain of administrative and constitutional law, 
that is to show how public law more broadly can benefit from the analysis of Vavilov presented 
here, this article relies on another public law case, Toronto (City) v Ontario (Attorney General), as 
a case study.21 This case lies outside of administrative law, involving instead a constitutional 
challenge to provincial legislation.22 This case is, invoking language used above, a quintessential 
constitutional case. Thus, it may be thought that Vavilov and Toronto (City) have little to say to 
each other. But this article shows that Vavilov, a major administrative law case dealing with 
standard of review in judicial review, has much to offer when it comes to understanding and 
resolving what is at stake in Toronto (City). These offerings are helpfully revealed when Vavilov 
 
Constitutionalism in Canada” (2020) 2 J Commonwealth L 1; Matthew Lewans, “Administrative Constitutionalism 
and the Unity of Public Law” (2018) 55:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 515.  
15 Gillian E Metzger, “Administrative Constitutionalism” (2013) 91 Texas L Rev 1897 at 1912. 
16Ibid.  
17 Ibid at 1900. 
18 Ibid at 1900. 
19 Ibid at 1900. As examples of these kinds of works of administrative constitutionalism, see e.g. William N Eskridge 
Jr & John Ferejohn, A republic of statutes: the new American Constitution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010); 
and Jerry L Mashaw, Creating the Administrative Constitution: The Lost One Hundred Years of the American 
Administrative Law” (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012). 
20 The two perspectives have meaningful areas of overlap but neither is subsumed by the other. 
21 2019 ONCA 732 [Toronto (City)]. 
22 Ibid at para 1. 
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is examined through the lenses of administrative and structural constitutionalism. Put in more 
critical terms, this article argues that the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Vavilov23—the biggest 
administrative law case in a decade—is an example of insufficient judicial attention to the 
structural matters underlying administrative review. Vavilov is, this article argues, a missed 
opportunity to model the kind of structural and administrative constitutionalist thinking that would 
strengthen Canadian public law and allow for deeper engagement with the countless issues and 
cases that lie at the intersection of constitutional and administrative law, cases like Toronto 
(City).24 As discussed below, when the structural issues at stake in Vavilov are brought to the 
surface, they are illuminating, both in approach and in substance, for the Toronto (City) appeal, by 
revealing neglected arguments and mapping some of the legal terrain on which the case would be 
received. 
This article proceeds in three parts. First, it provides an overview of Vavilov, pointing to 
its key legal developments for judicial review and some of its implications for administrative law. 
This part considers what the majority reasons in Vavilov contribute to the understanding of the 
structure of Canada’s constitutional order and the thin approach to constitutionalist reasoning they 
promote in administrative law. Second, it considers two additional matters of constitutional 
structure that are at stake in Vavilov but which are insufficiently addressed: (a) the consequences 
of an inconsistency between legislation and unwritten constitutional principles; and (b) the 
significance of institutional design to understanding the role, relationships, and reform of public 
actors. Each of these matters is also at stake in Toronto (City) and this part shows why it is 
important to look to Vavilov when resolving the issues in Toronto (City). This article concludes 
with a discussion of a third matter of constitutional structure and administrative constitutionalism 
that is implicated but neglected in Vavilov, and of relevance to Toronto (City): the place and status 
of the administrative state within the Canadian constitutional order. Vavilov was a perfect 
opportunity to engage with decades of administrative law developments in order to address some 
of that neglect, but unfortunately, the opportunity was missed.   
I. VAVILOV AND A NEW APPROACH TO JUDICIAL REVIEW 
 
The facts underlying Vavilov and (what became) its companion cases of Bell Canada v Canada 
(Attorney General) and National Football League v Canada (Attorney General)25 had already 
made these cases somewhat high profile before they arrived at the Supreme Court. Vavilov 
involved the citizenship status of the children of undercover Russian spies who had operated under 
assumed identities in North America for years (and is the real-life story behind a successful 
American television show). Bell Canada cases dealt with the airing of American Superbowl 
commercials, determining whether Canadian football fans could view these ads during Canadian 
broadcasts of the Superbowl. While the facts may have continued to generate some public interest 
in these cases, it was only at the Supreme Court that Vavilov and its companion cases took on high 
profile legal significance as the “administrative law trilogy.”  
 
23 Vavilov, supra note 1 at para 13. 
24 Metzger argues, from an American perspective, that judges often avoid explicitly acknowledging the constitutional 
dimensions of their administrative law decisions: Metzger, supra note 15 at 1914; and see Gillian E Metzger, 
“Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law” (2010) Col L Rev 479 at 506.  
25 Bell Canada v Canada (Attorney General), 2019 SCC 66 [Bell Canada]. This judgment deals with the issues at 
stake both between Bell Canada and the Attorney General of Canada and between the National Football League and 
the Attorney General of Canada.  
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The applications for leave to appeal in Vavilov and Bell Canada arrived at the Supreme 
Court a decade after the Court’s landmark decision in Dunsmuir v New Brunswick.26 Dunsmuir 
had sought to simplify certain features of judicial review by reducing the number of standards of 
review available in Canadian administrative law from three to two and by streamlining the analysis 
used to determine the applicable standard in individual cases. It also sought to provide clear and 
effective guidance on how to apply the two standards, striving to focus judicial review on the 
merits of applications rather than the preliminary issue of standard of review. But in the decade 
after Dunsmuir, consensus emerged that the Court’s laudatory aims had not been realized.27 
Criticism of the judicial review jurisprudence in the years after Dunsmuir was widespread, cut 
across areas of law, and came from the bench, the bar, and the academy.28  
The leave applications in Vavilov and Bell Canada also arrived at the Court at a time of 
unrest on certain administrative law issues amongst the judges. The Court’s administrative law 
opinions since Dunsmuir and in particular over the past several years reflected deep divisions on 
major foundational issues, including on the elements of the standard of review analysis, the 
outcome of the analysis in particular cases, and application of the reasonableness standard.29 
Further, the case law reflected a restlessness amongst the judges, a restlessness borne of frustration 
with the status quo and manifesting in repeated (and unsuccessful) attempts by individual judges 
to corral the bench into consensus on reform related to standard of review.30 Further still, Vavilov 
and Bell Canada arrived at the Court at a time when the case law had been affirming deference as 
the preferred posture of reviewing judges,31 but was also witnessing a growing resistance to and 
questioning of the foundations and realities of deferential review.32  
The critical consensus from commentators, combined with the division, restlessness, 
posture, and resistance within the Court itself, culminated in the Court’s decision to rely on Vavilov 
and Bell Canada as an opportunity to “consider”—or more accurately reconsider—“the nature and 
scope of judicial review of administrative action, as addressed in Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 
[2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, 2008 SCC 9, and subsequent cases.”33 Announcing this intention in its (very 
rarely issued) reasons on the applications for leave to appeal, the Court further noted, “[t]o that 
end, the appellant and respondent are invited to devote a substantial part of their written and oral 
submissions on the appeal to the question of standard of review, and shall be allowed to file and 
serve a factum on appeal of at most 45 pages.”34 Three months later, the Chief Justice appointed 
 
26 2008 SCC 9 [Dunsmuir]. 
27 See e.g. Paul Daly and Leonid Sirota, Canadian Journal of Administrative Law and Practice Special Issue - A 
Dunsmuir Decade/Les 10 ans de Dunsmuir (Toronto: Carswell, 2018); David Stratas, “The Canadian Law of Judicial 
Review: A Plea for Doctrinal Coherence and Consistency” SSNR (17 February 2016), online: 
<ssrn.com/abstract=2733751 > [perma.cc/35DL-7BHU].  
28 Ibid.  
29 See e.g. Law Society of British Columbia v Trinity Western University, 2018 SCC 32 [TWU]; Edmonton (City) v 
Edmonton East (Capilano) Shopping Centres Ltd., 2016 SCC 47 [Edmonton East]; Canada (Canadian Human Rights 
Commission) v Canada (Attorney General), 2018 SCC 31 [CHRC]; Dunsmuir, supra note 26.  
30 See e.g. Wilson v Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, 2016 SCC 29 [Wilson]; TWU, supra note 29. 
31 See e.g. Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 
62 [Newfoundland Nurses]; Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v Alberta Teachers’ Association, 2011 
SCC 61 [Alberta Teachers]; McLean v British Columbia (Securities Commission), 2013 SCC 67 [McLean]. 
32 See e.g. Edmonton East, supra note 29; CHRC, supra note 29.  
33 Bell Canada v Canada (Attorney General), 2017 FCA 249, leave to appeal to SCC granted, 37896 (10 May 2018); 
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration v Alexander Vavilov, 2017 FCA 132, leave to appeal to SCC granted, 37748 
(10 May 2018).  
34 Ibid. 
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two amici curiae to make written and oral submissions in the three cases, and the next month, 
Justice Karakatsanis granted intervenor status to the twenty-seven individuals and groups that had 
applied to participate.35 With these developments, the much-hyped and eagerly anticipated 
administrative law trilogy—with Vavilov as the lead case—was born. 
There is no better reminder of the practical and material impact that administrative decision 
makers can have on individuals than Vavilov. This article focuses on the legal analysis and 
implications of the case, but does so with full appreciation that this case is ultimately about the 
traumatic personal experience of two brothers that was exacerbated and legalized by failures of 
bureaucratic decision-making.36 In a condensed version of the key legal facts,37 this case begins 
with a decision of the Registrar of Citizenship (“Registrar”) to cancel the citizenship certificate of 
Alexander Vavilov. Mr. Vavilov was born in Canada in 1994 to parents who, at the time and for 
many subsequent years, were believed to be Canadian citizens. As a Canadian-born child of 
Canadian parents, Mr. Vavilov was legally entitled to Canadian citizenship.38 In 2010, it was 
discovered that Mr. Vavilov’s parents had been living in Canada and then in the United States 
under false identities and had been, for Mr. Vavilov’s whole life, operating as undercover agents 
for Russia. After his parents pled guilty to charges of espionage and were returned to Russia, Mr. 
Vavilov applied to renew his Canadian passport; his application was denied. He was told that, in 
addition to his Canadian birth certificate, he needed a certificate of citizenship in order to renew 
his passport. He applied for and received this certificate in 2013; the following year, it was 
cancelled. 
The Canadian Registrar of Citizenship is responsible for granting and, when necessary, 
cancelling certificates of citizenship and so, it was the Registrar who ultimately cancelled Mr. 
Vavilov’s citizenship certificate (“the cancellation decision”). The Registrar’s decision was based 
on a report prepared by an analyst within Citizenship and Immigration Canada. The report included 
an interpretation of section 3(2)(a) of the Citizenship Act. Section 3(2)(a) establishes an exception 
to the general rules of citizenship entitlement. It provides that the general rule that a person born 
in Canada is entitled to citizenship “does not apply to a person if, at the time of his birth, neither 
of his parents was a citizen or lawfully admitted to Canada for permanent residence and either of 
his parents was (a) a diplomatic or consular officer or other representative or employee in Canada 
of a foreign government.”39 The report concluded that section 3(2)(a) applies to employees of 
foreign governments even if those employees did not enjoy diplomatic and consular privileges. 
Accepting this interpretation and applying it to Mr. Vavilov’s case, the Registrar determined that 
Mr. Vavilov was not entitled to Canadian citizenship and thus, cancelled his certificate pursuant 
to section 26(3) of the Citizenship Regulations.40  
Mr. Vavilov applied for judicial review of the Registrar’s decision on grounds of 
procedural unfairness and substantive unreasonableness. The Federal Court dismissed the 
 
35 Supreme Court of Canada, “Docket 37748 Minister of Citizenship and Immigration v. Alexander Vavilov” Supreme 
Court of Canada (4 May 2018), online: <www.scc-csc.ca/case-dossier/info/dock-regi-eng.aspx?cas=37748> 
[perma.cc/DCW8-C275]. 
36 The Associated Press, “Son of Russian Spies Relieved to Keep Canadian Citizenship” (21 December 2019), online: 
CBC News <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/son-of-russian-spies-relieved-to-keep-canadian-citizenship-
1.5405790> [perma.cc/EZ6Q-GWXX]. 
37 Facts summarized in Vavilov, supra note 1.  
38 Citizenship Act, RSC 1985, c C-29, s 3(1).  
39 Ibid, s 3(2)(a). 
40 SOR/93-246, s 26(3).  
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application.41 On appeal, a majority in the Federal Court of Appeal held that the Registrar’s 
interpretation of section 3(2)(a) of the Citizenship Act was unreasonable and quashed the 
cancellation decision.42 The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration appealed to the Supreme 
Court. At this stage and in the ways noted above, the case became about much more than Mr. 
Vavilov’s citizenship status.  
On the merits, the Supreme Court unanimously agreed that the Registrar’s interpretation 
of the Citizenship Act was unreasonable and thus, the decision to cancel Mr. Vavilov’s certificate 
of citizenship could not stand. But the Court was divided on many aspects of the broader agenda 
it had set for itself. There is much to explore in the division between the seven-judge majority and 
the concurring minority reasons of Justices Abella and Karakatsanis, and indeed, much to analyze 
and assess in the case as a whole. This article does not try to exhaust that analysis and assessment. 
There is much more to say about Vavilov from a general administrative law perspective,43 as well 
as from the perspective of narrower areas of law under the administrative law umbrella.44 And 
there will be much to learn about the impact of Vavilov in these areas as reviewing courts carry 
out the daily practical work of judicial review and as decision-makers respond to the systemic 
demands of the case on the administrative justice sector. At this time, this article aims to contribute 
one claim to the conversation about the future of judicial review, namely that Vavilov represents a 
missed opportunity to surface many of the structural and constitutional issues that always underlie 
judicial review and that underlie the specific new approach to judicial review established in 
Vavilov. To make this argument, the article focuses on the majority opinion in Vavilov and its main 
claims. Accordingly, following the majority’s analysis, the summary of Vavilov set out below 
focuses on two issues: the new standard of review analysis, and the majority’s guidance on 
applying the reasonableness standard.  
 
A. THE NEW STANDARD OF REVIEW ANALYSIS  
 
One of the innovations of the Dunsmuir era was to rely primarily on precedent, categories, 
presumptions, and general expectations when identifying the standard of review in any particular 
case. The aim was simplification and so the Dunsmuir “standard of review analysis”45 sought to 
make the applicable standard easily identifiable in most cases. Contextual analysis was supposed 
to be rare and relied on only when necessary. In this way, Dunsmuir marked a turn away from the 
“pragmatic and functional” or factors-based approach to determining standard of review that 
governed the pre-Dunsmuir era.  
To respond to the critiques of Dunsmuir and its jurisprudential progeny, Vavilov doubles-
down on categories and simplification, writing context out of the standard of review analysis 
completely. The majority wants “greater coherence and predictability”46 in the law of standard of 
review, seeking to overcome demonstrable problems in real cases: uncertainties about when to rely 
 
41 Vavilov v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 960. 
42 Vavilov v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FCA 65. 
43 For an early contribution, see e.g. Paul Daly, “The Vavilov Framework and the Future of Canadian Administrative 
Law” SSRN (12 February 2020), online: <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3519681> 
[perma.cc/7LA6-R8AH]. 
44 For an early contribution, see e.g. Jamie Chai Yun Liew, “A Preliminary Assessment of whether the Vavilov 
Framework Adequately Addresses Concerns of Marginalized Communities in the Immigration Context” (2020) 98:2 
Can Bar Rev 398.  
45 Dunsmuir, supra note 26.   
46 Vavilov, supra note 1 at para 10. 
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on contextual factors, selective commitments to legislative intent, undue complexities in applying 
the standard of review analysis, and access to justice concerns flowing from the “costly debates” 
over standard of review.47 Accordingly, the majority sets out a new standard of review analysis, 
one that is intended to catch all cases without the need for contextual analysis.48  
What does the new framework entail?  
The starting point is a presumptive standard of reasonableness applied across all 
applications of judicial review. Invoking precedential trends and legislative intent, the majority 
explains, “for years, this Court’s jurisprudence has moved toward a recognition that the 
reasonableness standard should be the starting point for a court’s review of an administrative 
decision.”49 While an incremental step towards a presumptive application of reasonableness had 
been taken in Alberta Teachers50 and Edmonton East,51 the Vavilov majority completes the 
journey, stretching the limited presumption established in those cases to all applications of judicial 
review. The majority justifies this stretch on the basis of “respect for the legislature’s institutional 
design choice to delegate certain matters to non-judicial decision makers through statute.”52  
By defining the relevant legislative intent in terms of “institutional design,” the majority 
abandons a long-standing debate over the role of administrative expertise in the standard of review 
analysis. After Vavilov, courts should no longer speculate as to the legislature’s specific rationale 
for establishing a particular administrative scheme or presume that an administrative actor’s 
expertise justifies deference. Rather, the legislature’s ultimate institutional design choice to 
delegate a power to an administrative body cuts across all other possible rationales on which the 
legislature may have been relying, whether expertise, efficiency, flexibility, accessibility, and so 
on. “Institutional design” serves as an umbrella under which all of these rationales fit. The effect 
is that a “reviewing court need not evaluate which of these rationales apply in the case of a 
particular decision maker in order to determine the standard of review. Instead … it is the very fact 
that the legislature has chosen to delegate authority which justifies a default position of 
reasonableness review.”53 
The Vavilov presumption of reasonableness is, though, only a presumption. It is rebuttable 
on two grounds.  
First, legislative intent. Reasonableness will be displaced when the legislature “has 
indicated that it intends a different standard or set of standards to apply.”54 This will be the case in 
two kinds of situations: (a) where the legislature expressly prescribes the applicable standard of 
review; or (b) where the legislature provides that the decisions of a certain administrative actor can 
be appealed to a court.55 Establishing this statutory appeal mechanism to a court is, on the Vavilov 
approach, taken as a clear signal that the legislature intended for appellate standards to apply when 
the administrative decision at issue is challenged in court.  
 
47 Ibid at paras 7-9, 21-22.  
48 The majority explains that its approach “offers a comprehensive approach to determining the applicable standard of 
review. As a result, it is no longer necessary for courts to engage in a ‘contextual inquiry’… in order to identify the 
appropriate standard”: Ibid at para 17. See also Ibid at paras 69-70. 
49 Ibid at para 25. 
50 Alberta Teachers, supra note 31. 
51 Edmonton East, supra note 29. 
52 Ibid at para 26.  
53 Ibid at para 30 [emphasis in original].  
54 Vavilov, supra note 1 at para 17.  
55 Ibid at para 17. 
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Second, the rule of law. Reasonableness will be displaced when the rule of law requires 
that the correctness standard apply. According to the majority, the rule of law requires that 
correctness apply for the review of certain categories of questions—constitutional questions, 
general questions of law of central importance to the legal system as a whole, and questions related 
to the jurisdictional boundaries between two or more administrative bodies.56 According to the 
majority, applying the correctness standard to the review of these questions “respects the unique 
role of the judiciary in interpreting the Constitution and ensures that courts are able to provide the 
last word on questions for which the rule of law requires consistency and for which a final and 
determinate answer is necessary.”57  
The majority conceded that in setting out these five ways to rebut the presumption of 
reasonableness, it was not foreclosing the possibility that another ground of rebuttal could emerge 
in time. However, it notes that “at this time … these reasons address all of the situations in which 
a reviewing court should derogate from the presumption of reasonableness review.”58 Further, the 
majority strongly discourages parties from making context-based arguments to identify other 
categories and sets a high bar for recognition of new grounds for rebuttal.59 
With this new framework, the majority not only adopted a new approach to judicial review 
but also erased two major questions that have been lingering and generating debate in 
administrative law for years: when are contextual factors relevant to determining the standard of 
review in a particular case? (Answer: Never, except in the rare instance when a new “category of 
derogation” is warranted.) And do “true questions of jurisdiction” exist and thereby warrant 
another category of correctness? (Answer, no).  
 
B. THE APPLICATION OF REASONABLENESS  
 
The second new feature of the Vavilov approach to judicial review is its revised understanding of 
reasonableness. In introducing this understanding, the majority is striving, they say, for an 
approach to reasonableness that “focuses on justification, offers methodological consistency and 
reinforces the principle ‘that reasoned decision-making is the lynchpin of institutional 
legitimacy.’”60 
The majority’s framing of Vavilov reasonableness is familiar. The majority recalls and 
relies on much of the pre-Vavilov jurisprudence to frame its conception of reasonableness. It 
continues to be a standard calling for “judicial restraint” and respect for the “distinct role of 
administrative decision makers.”61 In a case in which reasons must be provided, the standard of 
reasonableness asks a reviewing court to begin with the reasons provided by a decision maker, 
“examining the reasons provided with ‘respectful attention’ and seeking to understand the 
reasoning process followed by the decision maker to arrive at its conclusion.”62 The reviewing 
court is to be concerned with the outcome of an administrative decision-making process, as well 
 
56 Ibid at para 53. 
57 Ibid at para 17.  
58 Ibid at para 69.  
59 Ibid at para 70. 
60 Ibid at para 74, citing amici curiae factum at para 12. 
61 Ibid at para 75. 
62 Ibid at para 84, citing Dunsmuir, supra note 26 at para 48, citing David Dyzenhaus, “The Politics of Deference: 
Judicial Review and Democracy” in M Taggart, ed, The Province of Administrative Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
1997) 279 at 286. 
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as the reasoning followed.63 Further, it is, as it has been since Dunsmuir and Khosa, a “‘single 
standard that takes its colour from the context.’”64 And ultimately, reasonableness is not a standard 
that demands perfection of administrative decision-makers,65 but rather seeks to ensure that the 
exercise of public power is characterized by the “hallmarks of reasonableness—justification, 
transparency and intelligibility.”66  
This framing of reasonableness is familiar but should not be taken to mean that Vavilov 
reasonableness is the same as Dunsmuir reasonableness. If Vavilov is applied as the majority seems 
to suggest it should be, reasonableness is now more demanding of both administrative decision-
makers and reviewing judges. It expands the meaning of reasonableness, expanding the grounds 
on which decisions can be quashed on judicial review. It holds that reasonable outcomes cannot 
stand if reached through flawed or incomplete reasoning,67 and reviewing judges are not, in the 
normal course, to fill gaps in administrative reasoning.68 
And so, what makes a decision unreasonable? The majority identifies “two types of 
fundamental flaws” that will reveal a decision’s unreasonableness: a failure of rationality internal 
to the reasoning process and a failure of justification in light of the legal and factual constraints 
that bear on the decision.69 While not exhaustive, these failures are sufficient to establish 
unreasonableness if “sufficiently central or significant” to a decision.70 On the first type of flaw, a 
decision will be unreasonable if the reasons for it, “read holistically,” do not “reveal a rational 
chain of analysis,” “reveal that the decision was based on an irrational chain of analysis,” show 
that “the conclusion reached cannot follow from the analysis undertaken,” “do not make it possible 
to understand the decision maker’s reasoning on a critical point,” or “exhibit clear logical fallacies, 
such as circular reasoning, false dilemmas, unfounded generalizations or an absurd premise.”71 On 
the second type of flaw, a decision will be unreasonable if it is not justified “in relation to the 
constellation of law and facts that are relevant to the decision.”72 The catalogue of relevant 
elements include, but are not limited to, “the governing statutory scheme, other relevant statutory 
or common law, the principles of statutory interpretation, the evidence before the decision maker 
and facts of which the decision maker may take notice, the submissions of the parties, the past 
practices and decisions of the administrative body, and the potential impact of the decision on the 
individual to whom it applies.”73 This catalogue is not intended to be a checklist and the relevant 
elements will always depend on the context. Ultimately, the task of the reviewing court is to 
determine whether the reasons and outcome, read in light of the relevant contextual elements, 
cause the court to “lose confidence in the outcome reached.”74 If so, the decision is unreasonable.  
 
63 Ibid at paras 84-85. 
64 Ibid at para 89, citing Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa, 2009 SCC 12 [Khosa]; Catalyst Paper v 
North Cowichan (District), 2012 SCC 2 at para 18 [Catalyst Paper]; Halifax (Regional Municipality) v Nova Scotia 
(Human Rights Commission), 2012 SCC 10 at para 44; Wilson, supra note 30 at para 22; Canada (Attorney General) 
v Igloo Vikski Inc, 2016 SCC 38 at para 57, per Côté J, dissenting but not on this point; TWU, supra note 29 at para 
53. 
65 Vavilov, supra note 1 at para 91. 
66 Ibid at para 99.  
67 Ibid at para 98. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid at para 101. 
70 Ibid at para 100. 
71 Ibid at paras 103-104. 
72 Ibid at para 105. 
73 Ibid at para 106. 
74 Ibid. 
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As promised, the majority’s discussion of reasonableness in Vavilov is more specific and 
prescriptive than the conceptual and case-by-case approach to reasonableness seen in the 
Dunsmuir era. This specificity aligns with the majority’s stated goal: to provide real guidance to 
courts that have struggled with the application of reasonableness in practice. The majority disputes 
the minority’s claims that Vavilov reasonableness is a “‘eulogy’ for deference” and that the 
majority’s approach will operate as a “checklist for ‘line-by-line’ reasonableness review.”75 The 
majority contends that its “clear wording” and “the delicate balance” underlying the framework 
counter the minority’s claims.76 It’s true that the text of the majority opinion embraces deference 
and rejects a line-by-line approach to reasonableness review. But the “delicate balance” to which 
the majority refers is less obvious and the majority’s rigorous review of the Registrar of 
Citizenship’s reasons under the reasonableness standard is deferential only insofar as it starts from 
the administrative reasons provided.  
Moreover, by identifying a set of contextual elements that are relevant to assessing the 
reasonableness of a decision, the Vavilov approach advises reviewing judges to move through 
them, one-by-one. While this “checklist” may not demand a “line-by-line” review of the 
administrative decision, it entails a fairly searching review of the reasons provided. Further, the 
majority indicates that a reviewing court must ensure that administrative reasoning sets out a chain 
of analysis that supports the conclusion; meaningfully accounts for the issues and concerns raised 
by the parties; is justified in light of the evidence; is consistent with the general principles of 
statutory interpretation; avoids any circular reasoning; addresses binding precedents and statutory 
provisions; is consistent with applicable international norms; and so on. How could a reviewing 
court ensure that these features of a reasonable decision are accounted for without something akin 
to a line-by-line review of the reasons offered by the administrative decision-maker?    
Simply put, Vavilov reasonableness is more demanding than Dunsmuir reasonableness. 
The indicators of unreasonableness just listed are new and go beyond any list of well-established 
examples from past cases. They set expectations that may not be, for lack of a better word, 
unreasonable in some administrative contexts. But, as will be discussed below, these expectations 
do not adequately account for the radical diversity of decision-makers within the administrative 
state. Further, it is disingenuous for the majority to suggest that the specific guidance it offers on 
reasonableness is merely a restatement, consolidation, or “clarification” of existing approaches to 
reasonableness.77 Vavilov reasonableness is new.    
 
C. THE BIGGER CONSTITUTIONAL PICTURE 
 
What are we to take from Vavilov’s new approach to judicial review? In terms of measuring its 
practical impact on judicial review, only time will tell. The Court is trying to affect real change 
and indeed, as described above, Vavilov turns away from Dunsmuir in meaningful analytical and 
conceptual ways. Early applications of the Vavilov approach indicate that it could offer courts a 
basis for more intrusive reasonableness review in some cases,78 but there is also caselaw to the 
contrary.79 And there’s no denying that correctness will apply more often in the Vavilov era than 
 
75 Ibid at para 145.  
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid at para 143. 
78 See e.g. Patel v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 77; Ennis v Canada (AG), 2020 FC 43; and 
Canadian National Railway Company v. Richardson International Limited, 2020 FCA 20.  
79 See e.g. Radzevicius v Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal, 2020 ONC 319. 
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it did in the age of Dunsmuir. This is inevitable when statutory appeal mechanisms and judicial 
review are no longer governed by the same standards of review. A different question is how the 
revised approach will trickle down to the administrative realm and affect administrative practice, 
and thus, the parties subject to administrative action. Again, we can only speculate at present, but 
it seems hard to imagine that there will be no effect. The Vavilov understanding of reasonableness 
demands more of administrative actors than did Dunsmuir in terms of reason-giving, statutory 
interpretation, and traditional legal analysis. Will decision-makers embrace or resist these 
demands? Or, more precisely, which decision-makers in what circumstances will embrace these 
demands and which decision-makers in what circumstances will resist them? What shapes will this 
embrace or resistance take? How will Vavilov be reflected in internal policies and procedures 
developed at the agency level? What training will be offered to administrative decision-makers in 
order to establish the conditions in which the Vavilov standards can be met?   
Similar questions should be asked at the level of legislative drafting. Will Vavilov have an 
effect on legislative design of administrative actors? While legislatures have always had the power 
to expressly prescribe standards of review and legislate the parameters of judicial review, the 
traditional judicial approach to privative clauses has perhaps undermined legislative motivation to 
prescribe standards of review.80 Vavilov’s affirmation that the courts will implement legislated 
standards of review, subject to constitutional concerns, may renew legislative energy to follow 
British Columbia’s footsteps in expressly identifying generally applicable standards of review.81 
Indeed, Vavilov reminds legislatures of their power in this regard.  
These questions about the practical impact of Vavilov will—and should—be the subject of 
study going forward. But what can be said now about Vavilov on doctrinal and jurisprudential 
grounds? Of particular interest here is what Vavilov offers to the understandings of Canada’s 
constitutional structure and of the relationship between administrative action and constitutional 
meaning. As noted above, all cases of judicial review are constitutional in the small “c” sense. At 
their heart and in very practical terms, they are cases about the proper relationship between 
branches of government and between particular actors within those branches. The standard of 
review analysis demands that we consider the relationship between the judiciary, executive actors, 
the legislature that created and empowered those actors, and the individuals affected by the 
impugned executive action. Accordingly, in every instance of judicial review of administrative 
action, the standard of review analysis is a proxy for charting and understanding the specific 
arrangement of the public institutions involved. Applying the standard of review is a similarly 
constitutional exercise. It requires a reviewing court to assess the legality of some executive action 
from a particular vantage point and in light of specific contextual factors. This vantage point is 
defined by constitutional relationships, those between the branches of government, and the 
contextual factors include not only input from legislation and executive policies and procedures, 
but also demands of the broader principles and grander institutional configurations that structure 
how the judiciary, the administrative state, the executive, the public, and the legislature are to 
interact with each other. In this way, every exercise of judicial review necessarily “bear[s] on 
organs of government” and thus implicates constitutional questions of a structural order.82 Each 
case, Vavilov included, is, then, at a minimum, an implicit statement about constitutionalism, the 
arrangement of the public order, and the place of the administrative state in that public order.   
 
80 See e.g. Dunsmuir, supra note 26 at paras 52 and 143. 
81 See e.g. Administrative Tribunals Act, SBC 2004, c 45, ss 58-59. 
82 Secession Reference, supra note 10 at para 50; OPSEU, supra note 3 at 57; Supreme Court Act Reference, supra 
note 10 at para 82; Senate Reform Reference, supra note 9 at para 26. 
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Vavilov is, of course, more than just a case of exercising powers of judicial review. It is the 
flagship case in the Supreme Court’s project of renovating the Canadian approach to judicial 
review. As such, the majority’s reasons serve as an explicit statement of the judges’ vision of the 
constitutional order, including the administrative state’s place within that order and the 
relationships between the branches of government. The vision underlies the approach to judicial 
review set out above. Judicial review necessarily bears on relationships between organs of 
government and speaks to the powers and responsibilities of state actors. In effect, judicial review 
is always an expression of constitutional structure; it must therefore be shaped and carried out with 
a deep appreciation of that structure and its legal implications. If this is the case, it seems to go 
without saying that the necessary structural analysis and appreciation must include some 
understanding and appreciation of the nature of the administrative state and its place in the 
constitutional order. A court cannot meaningfully design or execute an approach to judicial review 
without a rich account of the nature, character, powers, duties, and status of the administrative 
state in the grander public order, that is, in relation to the other major and local institutions of 
governance. Moreover, this account must be up to date, speaking to the realities of the 
administrative state as it is rather than as it was in earlier eras categorized by continued growth of 
the administrative sector rather than its well-established ubiquity.83 
The majority opinion in Vavilov does not expressly offer such a vision of the administrative 
state and looking deeper at the reasoning, we are left wondering what that vision might be. On the 
majority approach, administrative decision-makers are owed deference but that deference comes 
in the form of strict judicial oversight and in a hierarchical rule of law culture in which judges 
know best. Moreover, the majority aims to enhance the legitimacy of administrative decisions by 
cultivating a strong culture of justification,84 but to do so, it expects the reasoning of administrative 
actors subject to review (in addition to those subject to judicial appeal) to increasingly replicate 
that of courts. Further still, the majority affirms the distinctive and challenging diversity that 
characterizes the expansive set of actors that comprise the administrative state, but then writes out 
most of that diversity in both its standard of review analysis and its guidance on how to review 
administrative decisions.  
There may be a coherent vision of the administrative state in the majority’s reasoning; the 
tensions and aspirations underlying administrative justice and judicial review are not necessarily 
amenable to or in need of resolution. But what that vision might be or how the majority might 
explain its embrace of sustained tension is not obvious or even acknowledged. More attention to 
structural reasoning, and to the constitutional questions at stake, in administrative law and judicial 
review could have reminded the majority to contemplate these issues more deeply in developing 
its approach to judicial review in Vavilov and offered guidance for realizing its aspirations for 
judicial review going forward. Moreover, it could have avoided rendering Vavilov another example 
of insufficiently structural and constitutional thinking in administrative law. And it could have 
seized the opportunity to model, in approach and substance, the kind of public law thinking that is 
needed in cases, cases like Toronto (City), as discussed below, that must assess the legal 
 
83 On this point, see Kate Glover Berger, “The Constitutional Status of the Administrative State” [Berger, “The 
Constitutional Status”] [forthcoming]. 
84 Vavilov, supra note 1 at para 2. 
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consequences of institutional actions and relationships that involve or affect actors within the 
administrative state.85  
In addition, the majority’s reasoning raises questions about how to understand the position 
of the administrative state within the constitutional order as a whole, yet these questions—and any 
account of their answers—go unacknowledged in the majority reasons. The biggest shift on this 
issue flows from the majority’s justification for the presumption of deference. In the Dunsmuir era 
of judicial review, deference to administrative decision-makers was justified at least in part 
because of features of the administrative actor involved or of the administrative state as a whole, 
features such as field of expertise, specialized contextual knowledge within a particular legislative 
sphere, and on the ground experience with the polycentric issues to be dealt with by the 
administrative agency. But after Vavilov, the presumption of deference is justified not because of 
any feature or set of features of an administrative actor but rather because of executive and 
legislative policy decisions to delegate some authority to a statutory body. Thus, the nature of the 
administrative decision-maker, and the special circumstances in which decision-makers operate, 
is irrelevant.   
The majority’s shift in thinking on this point—the revised justification for the presumption 
of deference—is the result of structural reasoning. It is an artefact of the majority’s analysis of 
which institutional powers are of primary importance when setting the parameters of judicial 
review. According to the Vavilov majority, the legislative decision to delegate and how to construct 
that delegation is the foundation of the approach as a whole. The majority’s reasoning fits with the 
concerns of structural constitutionalists—it is about institutional relationships and powers. But the 
majority’s commitment to the structural constitutionalist perspective, more specifically, its 
structural reasoning, is thin because it fails to acknowledge its revised justification for deference 
as a constitutional shift. It justifies the change in pragmatic terms. As explained above, with the 
new approach, there is no need to assess the expertise of individual decision-makers, there is a 
degree of certainty available to parties seeking judicial review, access to justice is promoted, and 
so on. But the revised approach to deference does reflect a structural shift—the administrative state 
has been demoted from active agent to legislative observer. This shift not only affects the 
administrative state’s relative power but also raises questions about other administrative doctrines 
and powers—such as the power of an administrative decision-maker to hear and decide 
constitutional questions—that have been justified in terms of administrative strength, expertise, 
specialization, and access to justice.86 Does Vavilov undermine the authority of those precedents?  
The critique offered in this article is, in part, in agreement with a claim that has been raised 
elsewhere that one of Vavilov’s shortcomings is its lack of engagement with principle. For 
example, Paul Daly has argued that the majority’s reasoning ultimately prioritizes pragmatism 
over principle, and has provided examples from the reasoning where this can be seen.87 I agree 
and both this part and the next elaborate some of those examples. Noting the prioritization of 
pragmatism over principle is an important and useful comment on Vavilov as it highlights the need 
to be attentive to the practical, conceptual, and jurisprudential dimensions of the judgment, and to 
interrogate the choices made by the judges. As Daly explains, there may be good reasons to strive 
 
85 Consider, for example, how a richer analysis of the nature of administrative actors and of municipal councils in 
particular could thicken the interpretation of s 92(8) of the Constitution Act, 1867, as seen at Toronto (City), supra 
note 21 at paras 93-95.  
86 See e.g. Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v Martin; Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v 
Laseur, 2003 SCC 54; R v Conway, 2010 SCC 22. 
87 Daly, supra note 43.  
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for pragmatism at this particular administrative law moment however, that does not diminish or 
erase the effect of choosing to do so on the theoretical richness (or thinness) of Vavilov.88  
This article is similarly concerned with the theoretical wanting of Vavilov but the focus is 
somewhat different. The claim here is that by failing to engage on the level of principle, in 
particular principles of importance in administrative and structural constitutionalism, Vavilov is 
too self-regarding; it is too narrow in its outlook. It fails to acknowledge that the structural and 
constitutional questions at stake in every instance of judicial review are heightened in the exercise 
of articulating a new judicial approach to judicial review, and as a result, does not deeply engage 
with these questions. It positions itself as a transformative but pragmatic administrative law case. 
In this framing, the majority ignores the much more expansive public law terrain on which the case 
sits. 
In seizing Vavilov as an opportunity to undertake a project of reforming judicial review, 
the Court signalled that Vavilov would be an example of grand administrative law thinking; it 
intended the case to be transformative and to begin a new era of judicial review. The administrative 
law trilogy was therefore an opportunity for the Court to model the kind of deep structural and 
constitutional thinking that must underlie an approach to judicial review. Unfortunately, by 
prioritizing pragmatism at the expense of principle and by failing to acknowledge constitutional 
dimensions of its new approach, Vavilov missed that opportunity.  
II. MORE MISSED OPPORTUNITIES IN VAVILOV (AND THEIR 
BROADER IMPACT) 
 
The preceding part dealt with a structural shortcoming in the majority’s reasoning on the new 
approach to judicial review itself. This part turns its focus to two ways in which the Vavilov 
majority missed opportunities to engage with relevant matters of constitutional structure. It 
highlights the broader impact of these missed opportunities within public law using the case study 
of the Toronto (City) litigation. In brief, in Toronto (City) the City of Toronto (“City” or “Toronto”) 
is challenging the constitutionality of provisions of the Better Local Government Act, 201889 
(“BLGA”), arguing that these provisions contravene section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms,90 section 92(18) of the Constitution Act, 1867,91 and unwritten constitutional 
principles. In short, the Better Local Government Act, 2018 amended the City of Toronto Act, 
2006,92 the Municipal Act, 2001,93 and the Municipal Elections Act, 199694 with the effect of 
redrawing Toronto’s electoral map, requiring that the 2018 municipal election in Toronto proceed 
on the basis of the revised electoral map, and providing that Toronto’s City Council would now be 
composed of one councillor for each of the new wards.95 In effect, the BLGA reduced the number 
of electoral wards in the City, and thus the membership of the Council, from forty-seven to twenty-
five.  
 
88 Ibid.  
89 SO 2018, c 11 [BLGA].  
90 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 
1982 (UK), 1982, c 11. 
91 Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, reprinted in RSC 1985, App II, No 5. 
92 SO 2006, c 11. 
93 SO 2001, c 25. 
94 SO 1996, c. 32. 
95 BLGA, supra note 89. 
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The most controversial feature of the BLGA was its timing. It came into force on 14 August 
2018, in the middle of the City’s 2018 municipal election. The nomination period for the election 
had opened on 1 May 2018 and closed on 27 July 2018, and the election was scheduled for 22 
October 2018. Though the BLGA extended the nomination period until 14 September 2018, it 
retained the October election date. This extension did not address the time, money, care, and 
energy that had already been invested by candidates. The evidence established that at the time the 
BLGA came into force, candidates seeking Council seats had relied on the original forty-seven-
ward electoral structure when deciding where to run, the content of their platforms, how to connect 
with voters, fundraising models, and the design of their publicity campaigns. Indeed, “[a] great 
deal of the candidate’s time and money had been invested within the boundaries of a particular 
ward when the ward numbers and sizes were suddenly changed.”96 
The City’s constitutional challenge was successful at first instance.97 Justice Belobaba of 
the Superior Court held that the BLGA contravened section 2(b) of the Charter and could not be 
justified under section 1. He declared the impugned provisions of the BLGA to be of no force and 
effect and ordered the election to proceed as originally planned, on the basis of a forty-seven-ward 
model and a forty-seven-member Council. As it was unnecessary to do so, Belobaba J did not 
address the other constitutional arguments raised. In September 2018, the Court of Appeal granted 
a stay of Justice Belobaba’s order pending appeal.98 Accordingly, the election proceeded on the 
basis of a twenty-five-ward electoral map. In September 2019, a five-judge panel of the Court of 
Appeal allowed Ontario’s appeal of Belobaba J’s order. A majority of the panel concluded that the 
BLGA did not infringe section 2(b) of the Charter and that none of the other constitutional 
arguments could succeed.99 In rejecting these alternative arguments, Justice Miller held that 
“unwritten constitutional principles do not invest the judiciary with a free-standing power to 
invalidate legislation” and could not, as a result, be relied on to invalidate the BLGA.100 Further, 
he concluded that the unwritten constitutional principles of democracy and the rule of law were of 
no use in interpreting provincial legislative authority over municipalities provided for in section 
92(8) of the Constitution Act, 1867. As there was no open question of constitutional interpretation 
or a new legislative subject matter at stake in this case, unwritten constitutional principles were 
not relevant to delineating the province’s expansive legislative power over municipalities.101  
The case is now headed to the Supreme Court of Canada. In its materials, the City identifies 
three issues for the Court:102 First, does the Charter protect “the expression of electoral participants 
from substantial mid-election changes to the election framework and rules?” Second, can 
legislation be declared of no force and effect because it is inconsistent with the unwritten 
constitutional principles of democracy and/or the rule of law? And third, are municipal electors 
constitutionally entitled to effective representation?  
This summary shows that in approach, Toronto (City) is a standard constitutional challenge 
to legislation. In that sense, it may seem to be unrelated to, and likely unaffected by, the Supreme 
Court’s judgment in Vavilov. That initial reaction makes Toronto (City) an apt case study for this 
article, as my point is that the insights of structural and administrative constitutionalism from 
Vavilov are pertinent beyond the narrow judicial review context, thereby bolstering calls for greater 
 
96 City of Toronto et al v Ontario (AG), 2018 ONSC 5151 at para 29. 
97Ibid. 
98 Toronto (City) v Ontario (AG), 2018 ONCA 761 at para 1. 
99 Toronto (City), supra note 21 at paras 30-95. 
100 Ibid at para 89.  
101 Ibid at paras 93-95. 
102 Memorandum of Argument of the Applicant, City of Toronto (Application for Leave to Appeal) at para 9.   
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unity in public law analysis. To make this point, I turn now to two additional issues of 
constitutional structure that are at stake in Vavilov but which remain underdeveloped in the 
majority’s reasoning. These issues are not exhaustive of the kinds of sub-issues of structural and 
administrative constitutionalism at stake in cases of judicial review, but they are illustrative of the 
problem. The discussion of each example offers some insight into what the majority opinion 
implicitly says on these issues and considers the impact of this reasoning not only in Vavilov and 
in the judicial review context, but also outside of administrative law.   
 
A. UNWRITTEN PRINCIPLES AND THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
LEGISLATION  
 
The first structural issue that is implicated but not discussed in Vavilov is the constitutionality of 
legislation that is inconsistent with an unwritten principle of the Constitution. The issue is 
particularly interesting and fraught when the legislation in question deals with the powers and 
mandate of a public decision-maker, who is, of course, itself bound by the Constitution and its 
principles.  
This issue is addressed directly in Toronto (City). In his majority reasons, Miller JA rejects 
the City’s argument that provisions of the BLGA should be declared of no force and effect because 
they are inconsistent with unwritten principles of the Constitution, namely, democracy and the rule 
of law. Noting the primacy of constitutional text, concerns about “judicial governance,” and the 
near impossibility of legislative response to judicial declarations of invalidity,103 Miller JA 
concludes, as noted above, that “unwritten constitutional principles do not invest the judiciary with 
a free-standing power to invalidate legislation” and so they “cannot be invoked to invalidate the 
Act.”104  
Justice Miller rightly notes that the role of unwritten principles in invalidating statutory 
provisions is contested.105 But his definitive conclusion that unwritten principles writ large cannot 
be the basis of a declaration of constitutional invalidity is not consistent with the jurisprudence. 
While the courts have declined to declare legislative provisions of no force and effect when there 
is no inconsistency with an unwritten principle,106 the Supreme Court has indicated its willingness 
to make such declarations when such an inconsistency arises.107  
In the administrative and executive spheres, certain unwritten constitutional principles give 
rise to substantive legal obligations and have combined to construct the scaffolding for procedural 
design.108 The unwritten principle of judicial independence also sustains legislative obligations to 
implement specific decision-making procedures when certain conditions, such as judicial salary 
negotiations and, as I argue elsewhere, investigation of complaints against federally appointed 
 
103 Toronto (City), supra note 21 at paras 84-88. 
104 Ibid at para 89.  
105 Toronto (City), supra note 21 at para 84. See e.g. M D Walters, “Written Constitutions and Unwritten 
Constitutionalism” in G Huscroft, ed, Expounding the Constitution: Essays in Constitutional Theory (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008) 245; Janna Promislow & Naiomi Metallic, “Realizing Aboriginal Administrative Law” in 
Colleen Flood & Lorne Sossin, eds, Administrative Law in Context, 3d ed (Toronto: Edmond Publishing, 2017) 87. 
106 See e.g. Ell v Alberta, 2003 SCC 35 [Ell]; Reference re Rumuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of PEI, 
[1997] 3 SCR 3 [Remuneration Reference].  
107 See e.g. Ell, ibid.  
108 Roncarelli v Duplessis, [1959] SCR 121; Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73; 
and Secession Reference, supra note 10. 
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judges, are met.109 These are uses of the Constitution’s unwritten principles that are in addition to 
the interpretive and structural purposes that the principles serve. As the Supreme Court explains 
in the Secession Reference, the unwritten principles “breathe life” into the Constitution, 
“dictat[ing] major elements of the architecture of the Constitution itself and are as such its 
lifeblood.”110 They assist in “the interpretation of the text and the delineation of spheres of 
jurisdiction, the scope of rights and obligations, and the role of our political institutions.”111 And 
they are, the Court explained, meaningful sources of legal obligation:  
 
Underlying constitutional principles may in certain circumstances give rise to 
substantive legal obligations (have “full legal force”, as we described it in the 
Patriation Reference, supra, at p. 845), which constitute substantive limitations upon 
government action. These principles may give rise to very abstract and general 
obligations, or they may be more specific and precise in nature. The principles are not 
merely descriptive, but are also invested with a powerful normative force, and are 
binding upon both courts and governments. “In other words”, as this Court confirmed 
in the Manitoba Language Rights Reference, supra, at p. 752, “in the process of 
Constitutional adjudication, the Court may have regard to unwritten postulates which 
form the very foundation of the Constitution of Canada.”112 
 
There are general observations that can be made about unwritten principles, as seen in the 
Secession Reference, but it does not follow that all principles can or will serve all purposes in any 
particular situation or that each principle has the same normative effects as any other principle in 
specific cases. The details, including the meaning and content of any principle that is relevant in 
the circumstances, will always be determinative. This must be true in Toronto (City), as it is in 
every case. But the details must be examined; a simple rejection of the possibility of legislative 
unconstitutionality stemming from unwritten principles is not borne out in the jurisprudence.  
Vavilov was an opportunity for the Court to offer insight into the role of unwritten 
principles in assessing the constitutionality of legislation. In fact, the majority’s new approach to 
judicial review directly raised the issue, but the majority does not acknowledge or engage with it. 
Implicitly, though, the majority reasoning in Vavilov signals support for an argument that Miller 
JA erred in his definitive conclusion on unwritten principles. While the majority fails to complete 
its analysis on this point, the effect of Vavilov is that in at least some circumstances, legislation 
will not be given effect if it is inconsistent with the rule of law.  
The issue arises in Vavilov in relation to legislative prescriptions of the standard of review. 
Recall that one of the circumstances in which we are to derogate from the presumption of 
reasonableness is when the legislature identifies the applicable standard of review. The majority 
explains, “[w]here a court reviews the merits of an administrative decision … the standard of 
review it applies must reflect the legislature’s intent with respect to the role of the reviewing court, 
except where giving effect to that intent is precluded by the rule of law.”113 Explaining further, the 
 
109 Remuneration Reference, supra note 106; Kate Glover Berger, “The Administrative Demands of Unwritten 
Principles” (2020) 65:2 McGill LJ [forthcoming].  
110 Secession Reference, supra note 10 at para 51. 
111 Ibid at para 52. 
112 Ibid at para 54. 
113 Vavilov, supra note 1 at para 23.  
86
Glover Berger: Missing Constitutionalism of Canada v Vavilov
Published by Osgoode Digital Commons, 2021
 
 
majority contends that the courts must apply a legislated standard of review in order to give effect 
to legislative intent. The only limit will be the rule of law:  
 
It follows that where a legislature has indicated that courts are to apply the standard of 
correctness in reviewing certain questions, that standard must be applied. In British 
Columbia, the legislature has established the applicable standard of review for many 
tribunals by reference to the Administrative Tribunals Act, S.B.C. 2004, c. 45: see ss. 
58 and 59. For example, it has provided that the standard of review applicable to 
decisions on questions of statutory interpretation by the B.C. Human Rights Tribunal 
is to be correctness: ibid., s. 59(1); Human Rights Code, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 210, s. 32. 
We continue to be of the view that where the legislature has indicated the applicable 
standard of review, courts are bound to respect that designation, within the limits 
imposed by the rule of law.114    
 
Imagine, then, legislation that provides that a tribunal’s decisions regarding the division of 
powers are to be reviewed on the standard of reasonableness. What is the constitutional status of 
this legislative provision? The new standard of review analysis requires legislative prescriptions 
be followed. However, it also requires that legislative prescriptions be followed unless they are 
inconsistent with the rule of law. Recall that the majority also holds that the rule of law requires 
that constitutional questions be reviewed on a standard of correctness.115 It seems to follow that a 
court cannot give effect to a legislated standard of reasonableness on review of a constitutional 
question dealing with the division of powers.  
The majority does not call attention to the consequences of this conclusion or engage with 
the debates regarding unwritten principles. Those broader debates remain under the reasoning’s 
surface. But the implication of the majority’s reasoning is clear—legislative intent, even legislative 
intent clearly articulated in an otherwise valid statute, is constrained by the rule of law. Judicial 
review is, therefore, a context in which legislation that is inconsistent with the rule of law will not 
be given full effect.   
One might argue that this amounts to treating legislated standards of review like privative 
clauses: they are not given effect but are not unconstitutional. Yet this analogy does not work on 
the Vavilov model. The presence or absence of a privative clause was accounted for in the 
pragmatic and functional approach and the Dunsmuir contextual analysis. The legislative intent 
behind a privative clause was “given effect” insofar as it was folded into a broader contextual 
assessment of what standard of review should apply in a particular case. But the majority in Vavilov 
has abandoned any contextual analysis in the standard of review analysis. In the Vavilov universe, 
the only basis to refuse to give effect to legislative intent is the Constitution. And with this 
example, the constitutional basis is the unwritten principle of the rule of law.  
This issue is a clear matter of structural constitutionalism—a question of the normative and 
operational status of the unwritten principles and of the pressures these principles can exert on 
legislative action. The majority’s reasoning in Vavilov points to an undeniable potential for conflict 
in the circumstances—the rule of law cannot tolerate a posture of deference on a federalism 
question. But the majority offers no guidance on the constitutional consequences of this conflict. 
More broadly, by not acknowledging the issue, the Court misses the opportunity to signal to public 
law counsel and scholars to consider this manifestation of the conflict between unwritten principles 
 
114 Ibid at para 35.  
115 Ibid at paras 17, 54-57. 
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and legislation. It thus keeps this conflict between principle and prescription tucked within the 
administrative law sphere, without either drawing constitutional considerations into the 
administrative law analysis or projecting the issue into constitutional circles for consideration. 
Without merging the constitutional and administrative perspectives in this context, the majority 
reasoning in Vavilov signals that administrative law—and the administrative state—has its own 
constitutional law rather than participates in the development and elucidation of “regular” 
constitutional law. The majority had the chance to explain and justify this reasoning, limiting it if 
desired (and if possible). Instead, the reasons do not engage with the issue. The issue of the impact 
of unwritten principles on the constitutionality of legislation that affects administrative action is 
thus left to be resolved in Toronto (City), where the issue is raised head on.  
 
B. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 
 
The second structural issue that is implicated but remains under-analyzed in Vavilov is the legal 
significance of institutional design and reform. This claim may seem strange because the majority 
positions institutional design at the heart of its new standard of review analysis. As explained 
above, the majority justifies the new presumption of reasonableness, as well as one of the two 
grounds for derogating from this presumption, in terms of the legislature’s institutional design 
choices. With respect to the presumption, the majority explains that since the late 1970s, “the 
central rationale for applying a deferential standard of review in administrative law has been 
respect for the legislature’s institutional design choice to delegate certain matters to non-judicial 
decision makers through statute.”116 While other ‘sub’-rationales have also been offered to explain 
decisions to delegate authority to administrative decision-makers, such as expertise, efficiency, 
cost, and access to justice, the majority holds that those sub-rationales can all fall under the 
umbrella of institutional design choices. They explain, “[w]hile specialized expertise and these 
other rationales may all be reasons for a legislature to delegate decision-making authority, a 
reviewing court need not evaluate which of these rationales apply in the case of a particular 
decision maker in order to determine the standard of review. Instead … it is the very fact that the 
legislature has chosen to delegate authority which justifies a default position of reasonableness 
review.”117  
Similarly, on the Vavilov model, a legislature’s choice to define the relationship between 
an administrative actor and a reviewing court by either prescribing a standard of review or 
establishing a mechanism by which an administrative actor’s decisions can be appealed to the 
courts will be determinative of the applicable standard of review: whatever the legislature 
prescribes in the first instance, and the regular appellate standards in the second. These too are 
design choices, this time, explicit choices, about how to structure the relationship between 
institutions, rather than a choice to create and design a single organization.  
In this sense, it seems that the Vavilov majority is sensitive to the significance of 
institutional design in administrative law and public law relationships more broadly. And indeed, 
this sensitivity is an advance in the law as it avoids the easily undermined reliance on expertise, 
expediency, or cost-effectiveness that has justified deference in the past. But in looking more 
deeply at the majority’s approach to institutional design in the Vavilov decision as a whole, we see 
that it too needs greater consistency, reach, and nuance. Consider a few examples.  
 
116 Ibid at para 26.  
117 Ibid at para 30 [emphasis in original].  
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First, the majority does not explain why the only design choices that are relevant to the 
new standard of review analysis are delegation, prescribed standards of review, and statutory 
appeal mechanisms. On the acontextual analysis that Vavilov demands, other design choices, and 
the interaction of the institutional features that flow from those choices, are irrelevant. What if, as 
Daly asks, an administrative actor’s enabling statute includes both a privative clause and a statutory 
appeal?118 The former, which also reflects a legislative choice about institutional design, would 
not be considered in the choice of standard of review. Further, what about the substantive purpose 
or mandate bestowed upon an administrative actor? This empowering and limiting legislative 
statement about the role that the actor is intended to play in the public order is, on the Vavilov 
model, also irrelevant to determining standard of review. In other words, it is irrelevant to 
determining whether a reviewing court owes deference to the decision-maker. This would be so 
even if it provided a strong indicator that deference should not be shown. Again, the majority 
leaves us wondering why some design choices are to be prioritized over others.  
Second, when it comes to applying the standard of reasonableness, the majority notes two 
fundamental flaws that reveal a decision’s unreasonableness. One is a form of contextual 
analysis—a reasonable decision must be justified in light of the relevant factual and legal 
constraints that operate on the decision maker. Those constraints include a set of legal and factual 
considerations that may be accounted for in any particular decision-making context. However, 
when the majority lists the constraints and applies them to the facts in Vavilov, there is no 
consideration of the nature of the decision-maker or its unique and particular set of institutional 
features. This is so even though the majority retains the general principles from Dunsmuir, 
Khosa,119 and Newfoundland Nurses120 that “the particular context of a decision constrains what 
will be reasonable for an administrative decision maker to decide in a given case” and that the 
“review of an administrative decision can be divorced neither from the institutional context in 
which the decision was made nor from the history of the proceedings.”121 These signals of the 
importance of the nature of an administrative decision-maker, its design features, and its 
operational realities are not, for the most part, reflected in the list of constraints that the majority 
goes on to identify as relevant (i.e. the statutory and common law applicable to the decision-maker, 
the principles of statutory interpretation, the evidence before the decision-maker, the submissions 
of the parties, the potential impact of the decision on the individual to whom it applies).   
The two potential exceptions included in the majority’s list are the administrative decision-
maker’s enabling statute and the past practices of the administrative actor. Both factors open the 
door to considering some institutional design features and the nature of a decision-maker in 
assessing what amounts to a reasonable decision in the particular decision-making context under 
review. That said, this potential is not particularly promising when read in conjunction with the 
majority’s review of the Registrar’s cancellation decision in Vavilov. That review, which is the 
first example of how to operationalize Vavilov, did not consider the nature, design, or features of 
the Registrar when concluding that her decision was unreasonable. The Registrar’s enabling statute 
was examined only with respect to the principles of statutory interpretation, not in a contextual 
analysis of what a reasonable decision of the Registrar should or could look like. 
Third and finally, the majority suggests that it is alive to the radical diversity that 
characterizes the administrative state in Canada. The majority writes that its new approach 
 
118 Daly, supra note 43. 
119 Khosa, supra note 64. 
120 Newfoundland Nurses, supra note 31. 
121 Vavilov, supra note 1 at paras 89, 91.  
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“accommodates all types of administrative decision making, in areas that range from immigration, 
prison administration and social security entitlements to labour relations, securities regulation and 
energy policy.”122 The majority expressly acknowledges that the diversity of decision-makers is 
an undeniable challenge for administrative law:  
 
In any attempt to develop a coherent and unified approach to judicial review, the sheer 
variety of decisions and decision makers that such an approach must account for poses 
an inescapable challenge. The administrative decision makers whose decisions may be 
subject to judicial review include specialized tribunals exercising adjudicative 
functions, independent regulatory bodies, ministers, front-line decision makers, and 
more. Their decisions vary in complexity and importance, ranging from the routine to 
the life-altering. These include matters of “high policy” on the one hand and “pure 
law” on the other. Such decisions will sometimes involve complex technical 
considerations. At other times, common sense and ordinary logic will suffice.123 
 
The majority goes on to say that its approach to reasonableness attends to this diversity 
within the administrative state:  
 
The approach to reasonableness review that we articulate in these reasons accounts for 
the diversity of administrative decision making by recognizing that what is reasonable 
in a given situation will always depend on the constraints imposed by the legal and 
factual context of the particular decision under review. These contextual constraints 
dictate the limits and contours of the space in which the decision maker may act and 
the types of solutions it may adopt. The fact that the contextual constraints operating 
on an administrative decision maker may vary from one decision to another does not 
pose a problem for the reasonableness standard, because each decision must be both 
justified by the administrative body and evaluated by reviewing courts in relation to 
its own particular context.124 
 
The majority’s acknowledgment that the administrative state comprises a diverse and 
sprawling set of decision-makers that differ across many metrics is an important affirmation of 
administrative law’s challenge—to be relevant and meaningful across this diversity. But how the 
majority’s approach actually accounts for this diversity is unclear. The acontextual nature of the 
Vavilov standard of review analysis now applies correctness to legal determinations by 
sophisticated tribunals subject to appeal, but does not account for the repeated pleas from 
marginalized and vulnerable communities in the corrections and immigration sectors for greater 
oversight of the reviewable (rather than appealable) decisions to which they are subject day-to-
day.125 Moreover, as explained above, the legal and factual constraints that are to be considered in 
the application of reasonableness provide little incentive or opportunity to seriously account for 
the institutional context in which an administrative decision is made. How then is diversity within 
the administrative state accounted for in practice? How would the majority’s review have been 
any different had it been reviewing the decision of the Minister of Citizenship rather than the 
 
122 Ibid at paras 11, 88-90.  
123 Ibid at para 88.  
124 Ibid at para 90. 
125 Factum of Queen’s Prison Law Clinic and the Respondent, Alexander Vavilov (SCC File No. 37748). 
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Registrar or, for that matter, had it been reviewing a decision of the National Energy Board rather 
than the Registrar? Beyond its statement that context matters, the answers to these questions 
remain uncertain.  
With each of these examples, we see the majority indicating that the nature and design of 
administrative decision-makers, both their internal design and the configuration of their 
relationships to other institutions, are important considerations in judicial review. These are 
meaningful (and correct) affirmations—administrative law must care deeply about institutional 
design if it can offer any guidance about the fairness or integrity of government decision-making. 
But in each of the ways set out above, the majority’s affirmations are revealed to be superficial 
and undermined either in application or when read in the context of the decision as a whole. This 
is so even though the Court received submissions from twenty-seven intervenors in this trilogy of 
cases that offered the Court perspectives from a diverse set of administrative sectors, including 
labour, immigration, landlord and tenant, prison administration, securities, environmental 
regulation, workplace health and safety, workers’ compensation, pharmacy regulation, children’s 
aid, government ministries, and so on. Again, we see a lack of careful attention to the questions 
and realities of institutional design in the administrative sphere in a case that positions itself as the 
major rethink of judicial review.  
In effect, then, the signal the majority ultimately sends is that institutional design and the 
nature of decision-makers are important to understanding the work of administrative actors and 
defining the relationship between the courts and the administrative state, but either not sufficiently 
important or not sufficiently understood to be operationalized in a coherent or nuanced way across 
the new judicial approach to judicial review. Both reasons are consequences of the chronic 
inattention to structural matters in public law thinking. Thus again, by examining the majority’s 
approach to institutional design, we can see that Vavilov was an opportunity to model the kind of 
thinking that is needed in order to assess the significance of institutional design and the impact of 
design reform on institutions and their relationships, but the opportunity was missed.  
Toronto (City) is a case in which we see the need for better understandings of the 
significance of institutional design and reform, and such modeling of structural thinking in public 
law cases. So far, the impugned state action in Toronto (City) has been framed in terms of the 
legislature’s redrawing of the electoral ward map and its corresponding reduction of the 
membership of Toronto’s City Council. The reduction in membership is framed in terms of 
interference with rights to effective representation and free political expression. In light of the 
electoral rights and free speech claims asserted by the City and affected candidates and electors, 
this framing, shaped by constitutional concerns, makes sense.126 But when the BLGA is considered 
from an administrative law perspective, a question about institutional design arises. The 
administrative law perspective asks whether the BLGA’s reform of Council, which not only 
reduced Council’s size and membership but also meaningfully altered (that is, shrunk) Council’s 
statutory powers, qualitatively changed the institution to which representatives were being elected. 
 
126 In contrast, the majority of the Court of Appeal rejected the integrity of this framing. It concluded that the City’s 
claim does not genuinely engage concerns about free expression but rather deals with “essentially a political matter”— 
that is, dissatisfaction with the timing of the legislature’s decision to reform Council, which, the majority contends, is 
“undeniably within the legitimate authority of the legislature” (supra note 90 at para 6). Further, the majority held that 
the City’s success at the application stage was a function of judicial rewriting of section 2(b) of the Charter; such a 
claim could not be sustained on a proper interpretation of the constitutional text (ibid at para 34). Finally, the majority 
rejected the City’s invocation of section 3 of the Charter, whether as an independent claim or as an aid to 
understanding the scope of section 2(b) protection. Section 3 does not apply to municipal elections, the majority 
concluded, and so is not relevant in this case (ibid at para 76).   
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And if this is the case, administrative law asks, what are the constitutional implications of this 
qualitative change? At what point does statutory reform of a representative institution, mid-
election or otherwise, unlawfully interfere with the principle of democracy or electoral rights? 
Answering this question requires a nuanced appreciation of the design of governance institutions 
and the impact of reform. This has been missing from the Toronto (City) case so far and, 
unfortunately, the opportunity in Vavilov to offer some insight into how to sensitively and 
rigorously account for design and reform choices was missed. 
III. CONCLUSION: VISIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
AND THE BOUNDARIES OF PUBLIC LAW 
 
In Toronto (City), Miller JA began his majority opinion with the observation that the Toronto City 
Council is “a creature of provincial legislation. Provincial legislation governs everything from its 
composition to the scope of its jurisdiction.”127 With this observation, Justice Miller was making 
the point that Toronto City Council (the “Council”) lacks independent constitutional status. Its 
mandate and authority, indeed the Council’s very existence, depends entirely on exercises of 
provincial legislative power.  
Justice Miller’s observation foreshadowed the constitutional analysis that followed and the 
majority’s rejection of the City’s claims for constitutional protection of municipal power against 
provincial intrusion. The observation also reflects a familiar conception of the administrative state. 
By highlighting the Council’s statutory status and character, Miller JA positions the Council as 
ordinary and dependent. As just another administrative actor, the Council sits alongside countless 
boards, tribunals, agencies, and other public actors that may play important roles in the delivery of 
public programs, but which are at the mercy of executive and legislative agendas on delegation.128  
This view is familiar and before Vavilov, I would have argued that Justice Miller’s 
comments do not account for the possibility that describing administrative actors as merely 
creatures of statute might be too simplistic and out-dated in a constitutional order in which 
administrative agencies are the principal settings in which individuals interact with the legal 
system, have their rights interpreted and implemented, and seek to access justice in their daily 
lives. Nor does it account for diversity within the administrative state and how the idiosyncratic 
features of a particular administrative actor might be relevant to assessing the place of that actor 
in the constitutional order.129 Indeed, I would have argued that the example of municipal councils 
highlights the need to consider whether Miller JA’s blanket account of the nature of administrative 
actors is at odds with realities on the ground.  
Enabling statutes are just one feature of municipal councils, albeit significant ones. But the 
nature of municipal power is unique. Councils are administrative institutions made up of elected 
officials who are directly accountable to their constituencies. They exercise legislative and 
executive functions that replicate those of the provincial and federal governments. And their 
jurisdiction captures the most local aspects of life such that their potential for impact on the daily 
lives of individuals, whether for good or ill, is tremendous. Indeed, it is because of the unique 
features of municipal councils—their democratic mandate, the nature of their powers, and the 
significance of their effect—that the courts have often shown a high degree of deference to council 
 
127 Toronto (City), supra note 21 at para 1.  
128 Catalyst Paper, supra note 64 at para 15. 
129 Consider e.g. Berger, “The Constitution,” supra note 5. 
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decision-making. While municipal councils do not have carte blanche when acting within their 
jurisdiction and while they remain subject to their enabling legislation, the Supreme Court has held 
that a municipal bylaw will be quashed on judicial review only if it is “one no reasonable body 
informed by [the wide variety of factors that could be relevant to municipal councils] could have 
taken.”130 Indeed, municipal bylaws tend to be upheld on judicial review unless they were found 
to be “aberrant,” “overwhelming,” or unadoptable by any reasonable body.131 The threshold for 
unreasonableness is high.132 All of these features cry out for a constitutional analysis that 
appreciates the unique and essential character of municipalities in the public order and that 
understands the constitutional status of municipalities accordingly.133  
Vavilov raises questions about claims for constitutional status by downplaying the unique 
features of administrative bodies in its account of the roles and relationships at play in judicial 
review. This seems to flip the switch on the Dunsmuir era of context-dependent analysis and 
administrative strength without an account of why or how to proceed, and without acknowledging 
the resulting constitutional shift. In this way, Vavilov participates in the chronic problem in 
administrative law that this article aims to expose, a problem that is witnessed in other public law 
cases, cases like Toronto (City), that lie at the intersection of constitutional and administrative law. 
The problem is insufficient attention to the constitutional questions, and more specifically, the 
questions of structural and administrative constitutionalism at stake.134 Whereas Vavilov represents 
a missed opportunity to respond to this problem, perhaps hope lies with Toronto (City).  
 
130 Catalyst Paper, supra note 64 at para 24. 
131 Ibid at para 20, citing Kruse v Johnson, [1898] 2 QB 91 (Div Ct); Associated Provincial Picture Houses, Ltd v 
Wednesbury Corp, [1948] 1 KB 223 (CA); Lehndorff United Properties (Canada) Ltd v Edmonton (City) (1993), 146 
AR 37 (QB), aff’d (1994), 157 AR 169 (CA).  
132 Catalyst Paper, supra note 64 at para 20. 
133Berger, “The Constitutional Status,” supra note 83. 
134 For different conceptions of the administrative state and the constitution, see e.g. Adrian Vermeule, Law’s 
Abnegation: From Law’s Empire to the Administrative State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016);  Harry 
Arthurs, Without the Law: Administrative Justice and Legal Pluralism in Nineteenth-Century England (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1985), and see generally, the literature cited, supra note 14. 
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